Defeating Sensor ID Spoofing, Replay, and Relay Attacks on the TPMS Radio Link

Cryptographic sensor pairing, rolling-code authentication, and signal-timing analysis that prevent attackers from injecting forged pressure readings or triggering false dashboard warnings remotely.

Cryptographic Pairing and Rolling-Code Authentication

During factory or service provisioning, each sensor is bound to the vehicle gateway through a shared secret injected via a low-frequency (LF) activation signal. Subsequent RF transmissions include a rolling counter authenticated with a lightweight MAC, so a captured packet cannot be replayed even seconds later without failing the freshness check.

Detecting Relay Attacks Through Physical-Layer Fingerprinting

A relay attack retransmits a legitimate sensor's signal from outside the vehicle to extend its apparent range. Receiver software counters this by fingerprinting expected RSSI decay curves and timing jitter per wheel position, flagging packets whose physical-layer characteristics deviate from the sensor's known installation profile.

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